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Aquinas on Attributes
BRIAN LEFTOW
Oriel College, Oxford
Aquinas’ theory of attributes is one of the most obscure, controversial
parts of his thought. There is no agreement even on so basic a matter as
where he falls in the standard scheme of classifying such theories: to
Copleston, he is a resemblance-nominalist1; to Armstrong, a “concept
nominalist”2; to Edwards and Spade, “almost as strong a realist as Duns
Scotus”3; to Gracia, Pannier, and Sullivan, neither realist nor nominalist4;
to Hamlyn, the Middle Ages’ “prime exponent of realism,” although his
theory adds elements of nominalism and “conceptualism”5; to Wolterstorff,
just inconsistent.6 I now set out Aquinas’ view and try to answer the vexed
question of how to classify it.
Part of the confusion here is terminological. As emerges below, Thomas
believed in “tropes” of “lowest” (infima) species of accidents and (I argue)
substances.7 Many now class trope theories as a form of nominalism,8 while
1. F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1955), P. 94.
2. D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), pp. 25, 83, 87. Armstrong is tentative about this.
3. Sandra Edwards, “The Realism of Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 59 (1985):
79; Paul Vincent Spade, “Degrees of Being, Degrees of Goodness,” in Aquinas’ Moral
Theory, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998), pp. 254–75. For present purposes, I need not discuss just what sort of
realism Scotus holds.
4. Pannier and Sullivan suggest that this was where Aquinas aimed unsuccess-
fully to end up, at least in his earlier work: Russell Pannier and Thomas Sullivan,
“Aquinas’ Solution to the Problem of Universals,” American Catholic Philosophical Quar-
terly 68 (1994): 159–72. Jorge Gracia suggests that Thomas rejects aspects of the
traditional formulation of the problem of universals (“Cutting the Gordian Knot of
Ontology: Thomas’ Solution to the Problem of Universals,” in Thomas Aquinas and
His Legacy ed. David Gallagher [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
Press, 1994], pp. 16–36. He does, however, wind up noting what I later call Thomas’
ontology of particulars.
5. D. M. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984),
p. 97.
6. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Universals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970), pp. 142–48.
7. Accidents also come in species and genera. As we see later, Thomas speaks
regularly of species of number, a quantitative accident. If two is a species, even and
number are genera into which it falls.
8. Following D. M. Armstrong, Universals (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
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some call them a form of “moderate realism.”9 Trope theories clearly have
a richer ontology than many forms of nominalism, just as clearly reject
realism’s shared attributes, and are naturally developed in ways using natural
classes or likenesses to do the work of universals. However, tropes are real
items which are not substances, real referents for property-terms present in
their bearers, whose presence makes their bearers what they are. So trope
theories are more like realism than other forms of nominalism. But I class
them ultimately as nominalist, reserving “realism” (as many do) for belief
in single attributes able to be really present in many particulars.
THE STATUS OF GENERA
Another part of the problem is that Aquinas offers a mixed account, as
Hamlyn sees. Like all medievals, he divided attributes according to the Por-
phyrian predicables, genus, difference, species, and accident. Species are
kinds. For medieval Aristotelians, any definable kind is defined in terms of
genus and difference. A genus is a broader kind of which the species is a
sub-kind. A difference is the distinguishing attribute that sets off a species
from other species within a genus—thus (supposedly) within the kind an-
imal, what distinguishes humans from all others is being rational. Species
form trees. Atop each tree is a highest genus. Each such genus is “divided” by
differences; in effect, the Gs sort into the Gs that are D1 and D2 and D3 . . . .
The result of each such division is a species “lower” in the tree, one less
extensive than the highest genus. The “divisions” continue until a level of
lowest species is reached. An infima species is the lowest species to which a par-
ticular belongs—the least extensive kind to which it belongs. Any kind that
is not an infima species or an ultimate genus is both a genus and a species—it
is a genus relative to kinds below it in the tree. Despite this, Thomas usually
reserves the term “species” for lowest species, and I will often follow his us-
age. An accident is any attribute that is not a genus, species, or difference.
Many accidents are had contingently and temporarily—it is accidental to
you to be reading these words. Some, however, are necessary: supposedly,
it is a necessary accident of being human to have a sense of humor. Acci-
dents both necessary to and unique to a single species are propria (proper
accidents) of items in that species.
Aquinas clearly believes that accidents are individuals in non-substance
categories, particulars dependent on their bearers: “tropes,” individuated
by their subjects,10 like Fido’s loyalty11: thus “this whiteness is . . . singular
9. John Haldane, “Forms of Thought,” in The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, ed.
Lewis Hahn (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 151–52.
10. Summa Theologiae (henceforth ST ) Ia 29, 1; 39, 3.
11. As Aquinas understands this, an accident could not be individuated by one
item and then transferred to another: there could not be (say) a case of loyalty which
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and particular and individual.”12 On genera, he is a reductionist. The
genus, Thomas writes, “signifies indeterminately the whole of what is in
the species”.13
A genus . . . implies in its signification, albeit indistinctly, the whole of
what is determinately in the species.14 The unity of a genus comes from
its indetermination or indifference—not so that what the genus signifies
is numerically one nature in diverse species, to which another thing
supervenes which is the differentia determining it . . . but because the
genus signifies a certain form, not determinately this or that form which
the difference expresses determinately (which is not other than the form
which the genus signifies indeterminately).15
If human is said in some way to come from animal and rational [a
genus and difference], it will not be as a third thing from two things,
but as a third concept from two concepts.16
There is a sense in which genera are, for Thomas, just a sort of concept,
hence, perhaps, Armstrong’s classification and Hamlyn’s mention of con-
ceptualism. Thomas speaks repeatedly of what genera “signify”; significa-
tion is a semantic property, of terms or concepts. Genus/difference is,
for Aquinas’s, not a composition of two things in the real order. Genera
“signify” (mean) in an indeterminate way the same reality species con-
cepts signify determinately (“specifically”). That reality is not “numeri-
cally one nature.” That is, there is not some one extramental attribute
a genus-concept always signifies, even though generic concepts do al-
ways signify extramental attributes. There is a concept animal, but no
single extramental attribute animal, which is the sense in which genera
are just concepts. Instead, to predicate a genus is to say that an item
has some form from among a range various differences express determi-
nately. This “some form” predication is true in virtue of the same form
the difference signifies: because the thing in question has this form from
this range, it has some form from this range. This is the significance
of saying that genus and difference signify the same form. Note that the
genus signifies both “the whole of what is in the species” and the difference.
was first Fido’s, then Spot’s. Thomas thinks that certain individuated accidents can
by miracle exist without any bearer (ST IIIa 77, 1), but this is obviously not the same
thing as acquiring a new bearer.
12. Quodl. IX, 2, 2, p. 184. See also In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1.
13. De Ente et Essentia, R. Mandonnet, ed., S. Thomae de Aquino Opuscula Omnia
(Paris: Lethielleux, 1927), vol. 1, (henceforth EE ) 3, 150. All translations are my
own.
14. EE 3, 151.
15. EE 3, 151.
16. EE 3, 150.
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This makes sense: if genera are nothing distinct in reality from the differen-
tiae which specify them, then there is no difference in reality between what
species- and difference-concepts signify.
For Thomas, then, genus-predications in effect involve existential quan-
tification over a (presumably) finite range of differences: “x is a G” analyzes
as (∃D)(x has D). This can also be read as predication of a finitely disjunc-
tive concept.17 To have some form from the relevant range is to have this
one or that one or that: to be an animal is to be a dog or a cat or . . . . The
disjunction applies to a particular animal in virtue of the disjunct the animal
has. (Because something is a dog, it is a dog or a cat . . . and so an animal.)
This is why the form the difference expresses determinately is the very one
the genus signifies indeterminately.18 Note that there is not, in Aquinas’s
eyes, a disjunctive attribute outside the mind to pair 1:1 with what is in ef-
fect a disjunctive concept. If he believed in one, he would not deny that
there is “numerically one nature” for genus-concepts to signify, as a disjunc-
tive attribute is numerically one. For that matter, Thomas does not think of
genus-concepts as disjunctive: I speak so just to get at the logic of his posi-
tion. Rather, there is for Thomas a logically unstructured concept abstracted
from the natures of less extensive/more specific kinds, whose content is such
that when used to speak of extramental things it signifies the difference of
the lowest-level kind under which a particular falls and the lowest-level kind
itself, but signifies these “indefinitely” or “indeterminately.”
For Aquinas, accidents are tropes and genera are just concepts; that
is, there are no generic attributes in reality, although every suitable use of
a genus-concept does signify some real attribute. Genera “reduce” without
remainder to the species below them. And since every species save the lowest
is also a genus, this part of Aquinas’ account applies to all species save infima
species. We now need only Aquinas’ account of these species-attributes to
have the whole of his account of attributes before us.
NATURES
Thomas approaches infima-species-attributes via the concept of a nature.
Thomas tells us that
A nature . . . can be considered in two ways. One is according to . . . its
proper content. This is an “absolute consideration” of the nature. It is
true to say of the nature so considered only what accrues to it [as] “ratio-
nal” and “animal” and other items which fall in its definition accrue to
17. For the claim that there are just finitely many species (and so differences),
see S. Thomae Aquinatis In Octos Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Turin: Marietti,
1965), on Book Three (henceforth cited in such forms as In III Phys.), l. 12, ##762–63.
18. The forms are the same reality; the concepts differ intensionally.
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“human” . . . if, then, one is asked whether the nature considered abso-
lutely can be called one or many, one should concede that it is neither.
For either is outside the concept of humanity, and either can happen
to it . . . it is one according as it is in Socrates (and it) is multiplied in
many . . . . The nature is considered in a second way according as it has
existence in this or in that . . . . This nature has two kinds of existence,
one in singulars, the other in the mind . . . in singulars, it has multiple
existence according to the diversity of singulars. Still, none of these ex-
istences belongs to the nature itself properly considered . . . it does not
pertain to the human qua human that it exist in this or that singular.
So . . . the nature of humans absolutely considered abstracts from any
existence.19
There are three ways to consider a nature: as in a thing that instances it, as
in a mind, or in itself (“absolutely”), apart from any relation to instances or
minds. But there are only two ways natures exist, in particulars and minds. We
can consider them without thinking them to be in either.20 But for Thomas,
they do not exist apart from these. If they did, it would not be true that “the
nature of humans absolutely considered abstracts from any existence,” and
natures would be some sort of Platonic abstract object.21 Thomas resolutely
rejects these.22
Considering natures absolutely, one considers only properties their
definitions include (if they are definable).23 Natures have in singulars
19. EE 4, 153. More precisely, this is an account of how those natures exist of
which we have concepts via the senses. There are also natures (e.g., those of angels
or God) that exist in another way, as identical with certain individuals. But we have
no sense-mediated concepts of them.
20. S. Thomae de Aquinatis In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentaria (Turin:
Marietti, 1925), on Book Two (henceforth cited in such forms as In II de Anima), l.
5, #379.
21. In II de Anima, l. 5, #378.
22. He goes so far as to call belief in such items “contrary to the Faith” (ST Ia
84, 5).
23. Accidents are definable, in an odd way (EE 7). So are infima species, in genus-
difference form. As we have seen, for Thomas, everything above infima species in the
tree of kinds “reduces” to infima species : concepts plus infima species are the whole
ontology of kinds. So the only natures Thomas commits to extramentally are defin-
able. Higher kind-concepts are also definable, in terms of concepts still higher in
the tree of kind-concepts. Defining these higher concepts also amounts to defining
a nature- but the nature defined is the infima species’: the genus-term in its definition
is definable, terms in this definition are definable, and so on up the tree. All these
definitions would be included in a suitably expanded definition of the infima species.
In a sense, then, the standard Aristotelian genus-difference definition for one of
these is just a shorthand. Highest genera cannot have genus-species definitions, and
so for Aristotelians are just not definable. But if there are such concepts, they too
have- are- “intelligible content.” This content is given simply in a case of “apprehen-
sion of indivisibles.” That is, this content is apprehended when we grasp the concept,
but as it is not further analyzable, it is “indivisible.”
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properties their definitions do not include: “according as it has being in this
or that . . . something is predicated of the nature per accidens, due to that in
which it exists. Thus, it is said that the nature, man, is white because Socrates
is white.”24 Natures have in minds properties their definitions do not include
and which they do not have in singulars: “human nature . . . does not have
the nature of a species according to its absolute consideration. Rather, this
is among the accidents that accrue to it according to the being it has in the
intellect.”25 Because of this, any sentence apparently ascribing a property
to a nature is ambiguous. The sentence “homo est species” expresses some-
thing true if it is about the nature as it is in minds, but something false if it is
about the nature as it is in matter. This ambiguity may even extend to logical
form. “Homo est animal ” and “homo est albus ” can both state truths about the
nature, homo. “Homo est albus” states that human nature is white, in a fairly
literal sense per accidens : in a white human, human nature contingently and
temporarily “coincides” with a case of whiteness, a white thing. So, as a claim
about a nature, “homo est albus” is an accidental predication. On the other
hand, one can render “homo est animal ” as “to be human is (inter alia) to be
an animal.” Thus, one can take “homo est animal ” as an assertion that one
concept includes another.26 This is an essential predication, and has roughly
a part-whole logic.
Let us look briefly at these ways to think about natures.
NATURES AND DEFINITIONS
Their definitions explicate natures considered absolutely. So we consider
the nature of horse absolutely when we think of what it is to be a horse, that
is, what is true of horses just qua horses. Asked “what are species-natures?,”
Aquinas may have no better answer to give than “what species-definitions
express.” Yet Aquinas’ claim that species-natures are definable can seem
incompatible with other things he says.27
Following Aristotle, Thomas holds that items definitions express have,
as such, some sort of unity, that is, are one of something: a definition signi-
fies “one what [quid].”28 Thomas also holds that “one” just means “undivided
being.”29 If this is so, whatever is one of something is an undivided case of
some strictly correlated sort of being. Yet as just noted, Thomas denies that
24. EE 4, 153.
25. EE 4, 154.
26. I would say “that one property includes another”; however, strictly speaking,
for Thomas, there is no property of animality.
27. Edwards briefly alludes to what may be the following problem (“Realism,”
100).
28. In VII Meta., l. 12, #1541.
29. ST Ia 11, 1c.
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natures have any sort of being of their own. It seems that, then though defin-
able (and so one) per se, natures are beings only accidentally; though defin-
able (and so one) intrinsically, existing is extrinsic to them. Thus, Thomas
seems committed to this inconsistent set of claims:
(1) Natures absolutely considered are intrinsically one of some-
thing.
(2) Whatever is intrinsically one of something intrinsically has some
sort of being.
(3) Natures absolutely considered have no sort of being intrinsically.
I submit that Thomas does not in fact hold (1), because he does not in
fact hold that natures are per se definable.30 For Thomas, recall, all species-
definition is by genus and difference, and these are “composed” as concepts,
not items in an extramental real order. Arguably, what words define are
first and foremost other words; so, too, what a concept defines is first and
foremost another concept. So natures are definable in their being in the mind,
not per se. Thomas writes,
Of that which in no way is, nothing can be said. For that of which some-
thing is said is apprehended, and so has a certain lesser being in the
apprehending intellect.31 One cannot form a proposition save about
a being, for that about which one forms a proposition must be appre-
hended by the intellect.32
“Of that which in no way is, nothing can be said”: natures apart from
their being in minds or instances are not definable, save in the sense that
they are able to exist in minds and there be definable.33 Natures are in the
fullest sense definable only insofar as they exist in some intellect. So what-
ever “unity” being definable involves is, like the nature’s being, accidental
and extrinsic. Perhaps Thomas’s best account of what species-natures are is
“items species-definitions express.” If so, this best account does not get to
the core of what species-natures are (state their nature, if you will). It just
lets us know when we are dealing with one.34
30. Spade, on the other hand, argues that Thomas must at least implicitly reject
(3) (Degrees of Being).
31. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, ed. Mandonnet (Paris:
LeTheielleux, 1929), vol. 1(henceforth In I Sent.), d. 19, q. 5, ad 5, p. 489. See also
In II Sent., d. 37, q, 1, a. 2, ad 3; ST Ia 16, 3 ad 2.
32. Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate , in S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones
Disputatae (Turin: Marietti, 1927), vol. 3 (henceforth DV ) 1, 1 ad 7, p. 4, my emphasis.
33. Nor need they have this modal attribute “on their own”: Thomas can say that
they have it only in their instances and in minds.
34. In Thomas’s terms, it states a proper accident of being a nature.
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This reply only moves Thomas from the fire to the frying pan if it entails
that grasping a truth about a nature promotes it from utter nothingness to
some strange half-existence. This, however, is not Thomas’ view. He thinks
rather that the sort of “being” involved here just is the existence of truths
about the item: “‘Existence’ has two senses . . . . Sometimes it signifies the
truth of a proposition, even about things that do not exist: thus we say that
blindness exists because it is true that a man is blind.”35 What a word “signi-
fies” when used in a certain sense is what it means. Thus, Thomas here says
that one kind of existence-assertion just means that certain propositions are
true. But his point is really just that it means that there are certain truths.
As Thomas sees it, there being truths does not require there being propo-
sitions. Truths exist in God’s intellect with no propositional expression.36
Thomas writes that,
“Being per se” has two senses. In one . . . it signifies the truth of propo-
sitions . . . . In (this) sense, one can call “being” anything about which
an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if the proposition posits
nothing in reality. It is in this sense . . . that we say . . . that blindness exists
in an eye. 37
“Being” has many senses. In one sense, “being” means something ex-
isting in nature . . . . In another, “being” signifies the truth of proposi-
tions . . . whatever things are called beings in the first sense are beings
in the second sense, for each thing that has natural existence in things
can be signified by an affirmative proposition. 38
Note the modality: the “being” tied to truth requires that an item can be
“signified by an affirmative proposition,” not that it actually be so. So, for
Thomas, the “being” a nature has when something is said about it just is
there being a truth, which, for Thomas, requires that some mind grasp the
truth. Thomas’s “of that which in no way is” thus does not commit him to
semi-existents or the like.
EXISTING IN, EXISTING AS
Natures are not in particulars as realist immanent universals, single con-
stituents present in many things. For Thomas, everything in particulars is
35. QD de Potentia Dei, in S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae (Turin:
Marietti, 1931) (henceforth DP) 7, 2 ad 1, p. 224.
36. ST Ia 14, 14.
37. EE 1, 143.
38. Aquinas, Scriptum, vol. 2, In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, p. 872. Thomas’ point
does not seem to be that calling beings in the first sense “beings” makes them beings
in the second sense. Were that his meaning, he would surely say not that these beings
can be signified by affirmative propositions but that they are so signified.
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particular: “in Socrates no commonness is found. Instead whatever is in him
is individuated. Human nature is not found in individuals with such a unity
as to be one thing belonging to whoever is human, which the nature of
a universal requires.”39 Further, even in minds, natures are, in one sense,
particular:
This understood nature has the nature of a universal according as it is
compared to things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of them
all. Still, according as it has being in this intellect or that, it is a particular
understood species.40
For Thomas, in fact, being universal is a way of representing:
the universality of (a) form . . . is . . . according as it is referred to things as
their likeness—as if one physical statue represented many people . . . it
would have the nature of commonness according as it was the common
representative of many.41
To be a universal is to represent more than one thing. Universals are just
mental particulars standing in relations of representation.42
Aquinas’ ontology is one of particulars. Yet one must still ask what kind
of particulars result when species natures are particularized. As noted earlier,
for Aquinas’, accidents are dependent particulars or “tropes.”43 He also,
I think, believes in tropes of species natures.44 If he does not, then, the
ultimate subjects of predication, substances, are themselves nondependent
tropes of their natures: Socrates is Socrates’ human nature, even if we cannot
say that Socrates is his humanity due to the way humanity signifies human
nature.45 Now Thomas is willing to let some concreta count as tropes; as
he sees it, human souls are both concrete (causally involved) and tropes
of the human substantial form. Further, he is willing to call Socrates an
essence, not just a thing having an essence.46 But Thomas argues that there
39. EE 4, 154.
40. EE 4, 154.
41. EE 4, 154.
42. Thus again Hamlyn’s “elements of conceptualism”: for Thomas, in one sense,
the only thing we predicate which is literally shared is a mental representation.
43. This is not to say that he believes in a pure-trope ontology, as in the works
of D. C. Williams or Keith Campbell. Rather, for Thomas, substances have prime
matter in their makeup (see, e.g., de Principiis Naturae), and this is not any sort of
trope. Nor, thinks Thomas, is any form of matter it constitutes in conjunction with
a form-trope.
44. So Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 301, and Gyula Klima, Ars Artium (Budapest: Institute of
Philosophy, 1988), pp. 150ff.
45. So Joseph Owens, “Common Nature,” Medieval Studies 19 (1957): 1–14.
46. EE 3, 152.
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is composition of essence and “individual matter” in material things.47 This
is so only if each material thing’s “individual matter” is discrete from its
essence. If a material thing just were its trope of its essence, every aspect of
it would be an aspect of this trope, and so nothing in it would be beyond its
essence—as in God, who is His own deity.48 (In this case, oddly, its essence
would include or have its accidents.) If material things are composed of
essence and “individual matter,” they have species-tropes rather than being
species-tropes.49 Thus, according to Thomas:
Because Socrates is not his humanity, but is a thing having humanity, for
this reason he has in himself material parts which are not parts of the
species, but . . . parts of this individual matter which is the principle of
individuation, as this flesh and these bones . . . if Socrates were his own
humanity, there would not be in Socrates parts which were not parts of
humanity.50
FLAT CONTRADICTION?
Tropes or no, Thomas’ position can seem to land him in contradiction
at once. For Thomas, natures have as existing in minds the property of
universality.51 Yet natures are not universal as they exist in matter. Now
suppose that, for Thomas, one single nature exists in matter and in mind at
once. As it exists in matter, it is not universal. As it exists in the mind, it is.
Supposing that it is one single thing, and is in both some matter and some
mind at once, it seems to follow that one single thing both is and is not
universal at once. Thomas is at pains to remind us where it is universal and
not. But it’s not really clear why this is supposed to help. If one single nature
is in Fido and is in my mind as a universal, the very nature that is in Fido
is a universal. It thus seems to follow that it has this property even in Fido,
though perhaps it acquires the trait elsewhere. If the full nature is fully in
47. ST Ia 3, 3, 18a; cf. Summa Contra Gentiles (henceforth SCG) I, 20.
48. ST Ia 3, 3.
49. Again, Thomas consistently speaks of natures as existing in singulars.
Medieval Aristotelians were not willing to speak of things as containing and as im-
proper parts of themselves (due to Aristotle’s discussion in Physics 4, 3). So Thomas
would not speak as he does if he took each nature simply to be the singular it is
in. These arguments assume that the referent of “individual matter” is the matter
in which the substance exists rather than the matter from which it comes. (For the
distinction, see De Principiis Naturae, c. 1, in R. Mandonnet, ed., S. Thomae Aquinatis
Opuscula Omnia [Paris: LeThielleux, 1927], vol. 1, c. 1, p. 8.) But Thomas’s example
of individual matter— “hae carnes et haec ossa”— is one of his standard examples
of matter in which.
50. In VII Meta., l. 11, ##1521, 1522, pp. 445–46.
51. ST Ia 85, 3 ad 1, 529a.
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both locations at once, the whole nature fully has both properties at once-
not at distinct times or in distinct temporal parts. It is a nice question just
how this avoids being a flat contradiction.52 I now consider several attempts
to show Thomas’ position consistent.
For Thomas, the nature is both universal and non-universal per accidens,
by its relations to other items, minds and clumps of matter.53 Thus, being
universal and being particular supervene on its relations to other things.
If so, they are themselves nonintrinsic, relational properties. So, you might
think, perhaps the seeming contradiction doesn’t get to the “core” of the
nature. But this does not help. Extrinsic as well as intrinsic properties can
be incompatible. I cannot be both referred to and not referred to by the
same utterance, for instance.
Another answer would say that, while natures absolutely considered
are not immanent realist universals, they are like them, and this helps. The
nature is at two places at once, and in one, it has extrinsic relations it does
not have in the other, due to which it counts as a universal. This is no worse
than caninity’s being near some dog food in Fido but not in Spot. Be this
as it may, Thomas would reject this move, as he will not tolerate immanent
realist universals. If one and the same nature is fully in two dogs at once,
it is a universal: period. And it is a universal in both, even if that character
accrues to it in Fido due to its presence in Spot (and vice-versa). If one and
the same nature is fully in the mind and in some matter at once, is not it
for like reasons equally and in both locations a universal?
Thomas cannot relativize the nature’s being universal and its being
not so to distinct temporal parts. But some might suggest that he could
relativize it to distinct spatial parts. Thomas allows that natures in matter
are extended and partitioned per accidens.54 If so, natures in some way have
parts if they have material instances, and necessarily so. So one might won-
der if necessarily, if a nature is both universal and nonuniversal, it has dis-
crete parts, in some of which it is nonuniversal: a nature is non-universal
in all its spatial parts, but universal in its nonspatial other “parts.” Now
this commits one to calling immaterial items in minds—species impressae—
parts of the nature. For if all its spatial incarnations are parts of it, and
then there is more of it beyond these, the more adds up to at least one
further part. This then makes Thomas’s natures bizarre beasts, consisting
at any one time in (say) all dogs plus all impressed species of dogs. But
even this will not buy an adequate answer. One problem is that this move
is not sufficiently general. Thomas believes in angels, who think. Their
52. One I owe to Jan Cover.
53. It is a bit paradoxical to speak so. If the nature considered absolutely has
no being, then the nature considered absolutely is a nonexistent, one wants to say,
and so it cannot be related to other things: there is no “it” to stand in relations.
Ultimately, I think this is correct.
54. ST Ia 8, 2 ad 3.
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thoughts are among their accidents. As such they have natures and are de-
finable, and there can be concepts of them. Each angelic thought is wholly
immaterial, and a particular thing. The impressed species (perhaps im-
pressed by God) other angels use to comprehend one angel’s thoughts
is universal (many thoughts might fall under it). The nature this species
catches is on Thomas’s terms both particular (in the angelic thoughts)
and universal (in various minds’ grasp of these thoughts), but without
spatial parts.
Thomas is at pains to stress that the nature is universal in some locations
(minds) but not others—universal here but not there, due to what receives
it in each location. This naturally suggests an indexing response: caninity is
not universal and non-universal, but universal-here and nonuniversal-there,
universal-in-Leftow’s-mind, nonuniversal-in-Fido. While these properties are
compatible, Thomas does not explicitly make this move, and it might not
solve the problem. If a sandwich has the indexed property of being fresh
on Tuesday and it is in fact Tuesday, the sandwich also has the unindexed
property of being fresh. So we would need a story to convince us that if the
nature has the indexed property of being universal in Leftow’s mind and it
is at Leftow’s mind, it is not just universal.
Still another reply would distinguish saying that the nature is universal
or particular from saying that the nature is in a universal or a particular.
We might treat a trope in a particular thing as really a compound or a set
consisting of the absolute nature plus something that “contracts it” to the
particular, and the mental trope as really a compound or set consisting of
the absolute nature plus a mind. In this way, the nature never is particular or
universal—contradiction averted—but items of which it is a constituent are
both. This solution obviously moves Aquinas close to Scotus. A better answer,
I think, is to recall that Thomas is not any sort of immanent realist. Not only
does he not hold that Socrates and Plato share a constituent, human nature,
but he also (I submit) holds that my impressed species of humanity does not
share a constituent with Socrates. My impressed species (the item my concept
of humanity expresses) is just one more particular trope, which happens
to be in a mind. (Since we needn’t worry about the niceties of Thomas’
cognitive psychology for present purposes, I’ll henceforth help myself to
the convenience of speaking as if my concept of humanity were the trope
of humanity in my mind.) There is not anything that is both universal and
not universal. No existing thing has both properties. The nature absolutely
considered precisely abstracts from any existence; the nature as it exists
always is just universal or just particular.
WHY NATURES?
If no entity is common to human-concepts and humans, why speak as if
the nature is? Why talk of things with no existence, no ontological status?
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Thomas himself thinks one can’t, as we have seen, and does not think he has,
or at least does not think he has in any finally objectionable way. His point is
that natures’ ontological status is not intrinsic (again, natures with intrinsic
being would be Platonica), not that they do not have one. Natures are tropes
and concepts.55 Both are comfortably real. “Absolute consideration” is just
a way of looking at tropes and concepts.
To have a trope of Fness is to have what it takes to be (an) F, that is, what
it takes to satisfy the concept F. The concept F is the concept whose content
is what it takes to be (an) F, that is, what a trope confers on its bearer.
These truisms suggest that there is a content, what it takes to be an F, which
concepts embody as something satisfiable and borne tropes as something
exemplifiable, which borne tropes confer and concepts represent. It is
convenient, at least, to have a term for such a common content. Again, talk
of “the” nature is like talk of “the” lion. It is a way to generalize about a lot
of particulars. “Absolutely considering” natures prescinds from inessentials,
to make one particular generalization. Every human, in virtue of having
a human-nature trope, satisfies “the same” definition (which exists only
as contents of mental particulars). So we can focus on “the” definition,
ignoring the plurality here, and say that the tropes have the same relation
to “it.”
Again, talk of natures is a convenient way to make distinctions. Hu-
mans satisfy many particular human-concepts, but not qua concepts or qua
particular. They satisfy them in virtue of what they are concepts of : their
content, usually a definition (according to Thomas).56 They satisfy them
in virtue of bearing tropes, but not qua tropes or qua borne. Rather, they
satisfy them in virtue of what the tropes are tropes of—what a definition
catches. And when you prescind from all these things, you find yourself
giving the same account of what it is in virtue of which humans satisfy the
concepts and what it is in virtue of which the concepts are satisfied by the hu-
mans. So, for convenience, you can introduce talk of “the” nature present
in two ways. Thomas speaks of “the” nature present as a trope to make
the point that it is not anything about the trope’s character as a trope or
its relation to a given individual that makes it a human-nature trope, but
instead that about it which a concept catches. Thomas speaks of “the” na-
ture present as a concept to make the point that concepts are concepts of
one thing rather than another not due to any fact about them as mental
particulars but due to their relations to definitions (to “what we have in
mind” by them)—that is, due to their content, to what sort of trope they
catch.
55. Which is not to say “wholes consisting of tropes and concepts.”
56. Not, however, for concepts of the highest genera and the transcendentals:
on Aristotelian terms, definitions for these are impossible, as definitions are all of
genus-difference form and there are no higher kinds to serve as genera in these
cases.
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Thomas also asserts that the nature absolutely considered is what we
predicate of particulars.57 A thing cannot be predicated if it is not there
to be. For Thomas, predication takes place in the mind; one predicates a
predicate-concept of a subject. The point to his nature-talk is that we pre-
dicate concepts, but not qua concepts: rather, qua having a certain content.
Why not just say that what is predicable is a concept or a term? Thomas wants
to say that we predicate of Socrates what he has, or exemplifies. Socrates does
not “have” a concept. Socrates has a human-trope. But we cannot predicate
that of him if we do not have the trope “in mind.” We have a concept “in
mind.” So we need a way to say that by having the concept in mind, we have
the trope in mind. Thomas uses talk of the nature absolutely considered as a
shorthand for the story he wants to tell here- for an account of intentionality
that is simply too long and cumbersome to plug in everywhere it is relevant.
The shorthand version runs this way. By predicating the concept, we pred-
icate having a trope. What makes the connection by which this is so is that
by predicating the concept, we predicate the very nature of which Socrates
has a trope. We predicate having this nature, the nature in this concept, and
Socrates does have this nature, though not as it exists in the intellect.
Thomas fully spells out his account of predicates’ intentionality only
in his account of elementary concept-formation. The elementary concept
of human nature is the natural result of a properly-functioning intellect’s
natural operations on data the senses present.58 There is, Thomas argues,
no way error can enter the process of concept-formation save through some
organic defect or malfunction of the body. If the senses function properly,
they deliver the sensible content of the external world. In fact, one can take
this as a tautology: to be the sensible content is to be what optimally func-
tioning senses would deliver. This tautology does not imply that whatever the
senses happen in fact to deliver is the world’s sensible content. As the senses
are powers of the appropriate organs, they can go wrong in as many ways
as their organs can be damaged, diseased or in other ways fail to function
properly.59 Aquinas’s thinks the intellect is not sited in an organ and does
not use an organ to function.60 But it does not follow that on his account the
body cannot impede the intellect’s function. For him, the brain generates
phantasms without which the mind cannot think, and contributes to the
mind’s memory as well. If the appropriate parts of the brain are damaged,
57. EE 4, 154–55.
58. “Elementary” distinguishes this concept from those which biologists, psy-
chologists etc. develop. Scientific accounts fill out elementary concepts. See John
Jenkins, “Aquinas on the Veracity of the Intellect,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991):
623–32; and Norman Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error and Ignorance,” in Aristotle and
His Medieval Interpreters, ed. Martin Tweedale and Richard Bosley (Calgary, Alberta:
University of Calgary Press, 1991), pp. 159–94.
59. E.g., ST Ia 78, 3.
60. ST Ia 75, 2.
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diseased, or fatigued, they will impede the mind’s functioning.61 So, owing
to the body’s involvement, even the intellect can fail to function properly.
If the intellect functions properly, it draws from the sensible content it is
presented whatever is such that intellect can grasp it (what is “intelligible”).
If both intellect and senses function properly, then whatever intelligible
content existed in the external world finds its way to the intellect. And this
amounts to a tautology much as in the sense-case: the world’s intelligible
content is what a properly-functioning intellect acting on the data of prop-
erly functioning senses would deliver. To be the world’s intelligible content
is to be what a properly-functioning intellect given appropriate data would
deliver of the world. Note that here as in the sense case, the tautology does
not imply that things’ intelligible content is whatever the intellect happens
in fact to deliver. Now a thing’s intelligible content is its nature, that is, what
an adequate statement of what it is would express. To have found its way to
the intellect is to “exist” there. And this is in the intellect in the form of a uni-
versal concept because that is how intellect’s contents are individuated. On
Thomas’s account, what human intellects do is receive sensible particulars’
forms apart from matter and the conditions that go with matter.62 To do so
is to receive a nature that is universal, or predicable of many.63 To Thomas,
cases of natures outside the mind are multiplied only by existing in distinct
clumps of matter.64 So one condition of a nature which goes with matter
is being paired 1 to 1 with clumps. Thus, if the intellect were to abstract
humanity from Socrates, abstract humanity from Plato, and thereby grasp
two natures rather than one nature equally predicable of the two, it would
not be grasping those natures apart from the conditions they have in matter.
It is distinctive of intellect to individuate its contents in just this way, that is,
to abstract the natures of two individuals of the same species and thereby
grasp just one nature equally predicable of two, or indefinitely many.65 This
is precisely why Thomas is willing to say that the human intellect has the uni-
versal as it proper object.66 This concept is universal because it represents
every other human as well as it represents Socrates; by way of it the intellect,
as such, cannot discriminate Socrates from any other human.67
So to say that the same nature that is in Socrates is in the intellect is
simply to say that the intellect catches what it ought to catch of Socrates’
61. SCG II 79.
62. ST Ia 85, 1. The “form” here is the nature, or forma totius : for this equation
see In V Meta, l. 2, #764, and l. 5, #822; EE, ch. 3, p. 18.
63. ST Ia 85, 3 ad 1; EE, chap. 3. Strictly, what the mind receives is the species
impressa, but what is predicated is the concept the mind forms on that basis, the
species expressa. I take it that predicating a concept which expresses our grasp of a
nature is a way of predicating the nature itself.
64. E.g., DT 4, 2.
65. Edwards, “Realism,” 99.
66. ST Ia 85, 3.
67. What is opaque here is explained below.
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nature. We predicate of Socrates the nature he in fact has because we
predicate of him a concept appropriately caused by something bearing a
substantial-kind trope in conjunction with properly functioning senses and
intellect. As I have construed Thomas’s account of elementary concepts,
natures absolutely considered play no real role: talk of them is just a fac¸on
de parler. Pasnau suggests that one cannot thus parse them out of Thomas’s
account of the mind-world relation. For as Pasnau sees it, Thomas’s claim
that the very nature (or form) of the object known is in the knowing intellect
falls directly out of the story so far told, given Thomas’s perfectly general
claim that agents act by impressing some likeness of their form- however
distant- on patients.68
One thing heats another by impressing the form of heat on the other.
The thing heated thus becomes formally identical with the agent, insofar
as both are hot. Hence they also become like one another, insofar as they
share the same form (the form of heat) . . . on this scheme, one object is
like another (hence, is in some respect formally identical to another) if
and only if the two are causally related . . . . It’s because external objects
make an impression on our sensory organs and (indirectly) on our
higher-order faculties that those impressions . . . are formally identical
to . . . external objects. Formal identity is thus guaranteed by our causal
connections with the world.69
Given the general causal principle, Pasnau suggests, Thomas is commit-
ted to the claim that if the causal story exists, there is some likeness be-
tween what the intellect contains and what was originally in the agent.
Likeness for Thomas is always founded on some “agreement or commu-
nication of form.”70 So if there is a likeness between concept and ex-
ternal thing, there is “agreement or communication” of form. Pasnau
glosses this in terms of “formal identity,” some literal identity of form,
the same form being in both places. For if likeness is always based on
an agreement and the agreement is just another likeness, then this like-
ness too will rest on an agreement, which itself will be a likeness, ad
infinitum. The regress would moreover seem vicious, because we would
never get to anything more basic than a likeness and so able to explain
it.
But actually the causal likeness principle does not entail what Pasnau
thinks. The external object makes its impact on the senses; the causal like-
ness principle thus entails that the senses’ contents are somehow like the
external object. The intellect in turn acts on the sense-content to generate
68. ST Ia 4, 3.
69. Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997), pp. 304–5.
70. ST Ia 4, 3, 25b.
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concepts and species. But the causal likeness principle does not guarantee
that these in some way resemble the sense-contents. This is not a case of the
senses acting on the intellect, a power of the immaterial soul that, according
to Thomas, does not make use of any physical organ. The senses and their
contents are patients, not agents. If the intellect acts on the sense-content,
what follows given the causal-likeness principle is at most that the result of
this is somehow like the intellect. Further, even if the causal-likeness princi-
ple did guarantee a likeness here, it still would not follow that the resulting
intellectual representation was in any particular respect like the external ob-
ject. If A is like B in some respect and B is like C in the same respect, it
doesn’t follow that A is like C in that respect. Red is like purple in respect
of color and purple is like blue in respect of color, but red is not like blue
in respect of color. Although they are alike in the looser sense that both are
colors, they do not resemble in color. They are about as unalike as colors
get. Thus we do not have to infer from Thomas’s causal-likeness principle
that his talk of single natures in both mind and world has any thickness, any
metaphysical teeth. It remains, as I say, a fac¸on de parler. Taken just as such,
the absolutely-considered nature does not exist. What does not exist does
not do ontological work.71 Thomas would be flatly inconsistent if he denied
all intrinsic being to the absolute nature and yet had it do metaphysical or
semantic jobs for which some intrinsic being is required.72 I am working
out a reading of Thomas on which he is not inconsistent in this way. I try to
show it textually adequate; if it is, charity suggests that we adopt it.
Another use Thomas has for nature-talk piggybacks on his story about
intentionality. In Thomas’s theory of attributes, nature-talk lets him claim
that we can and do have the “right” classifying-scheme, that the divisions
we make into things having one kind-nature and things having another
are correct. Realists claim that we have the “right” conceptual scheme by
saying that particulars share real constituents, and our concepts group to-
gether just items which share those constituents. Thomas’s way to claim that
our conceptual scheme catches things’ real natures is to say that we have
concepts that realize within the mind the very content which is realized in
extra-mental things. If my concept of human nature realizes the same con-
tent that is realized in Socrates and the same content that is realized in Plato,
it classes both as humans and is correct to do so, even if Socrates and Plato
have no common constituents. Rather than speak of constituents common
to many extramental things, Thomas speaks of an item common to mind
and world. However, such talk is ultimately a placeholder for the complex
71. We do sometimes appeal to absences in causal explanations (“the ship was
wrecked because the pilot was not at the wheel”). But absences exist—they are real
lacks. More to the point, what really does the causal work is not the absence, which
is, at most, a permitting factor which lets the real causes work. What wrecks the ship
are the waves and the reef; by talking of the pilot we note only that had he been at
the wheel, these factors would have been foiled.
72. Spade, “Degrees of Being,” complains of just this.
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story sketched above, told on the border of epistemology and Aristotelian
cognitive science. It is by that story that Thomas tries to suggest that our
concepts really do slice nature at its joints.73
Thomas also uses talk of natures to keep his view of predication from
generating absurd consequences:
The term “species” is not predicated of Socrates. It would be, of necessity,
if the nature of a species accrued to human according to the being it has
in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, i.e. qua human.
For whatever accrues to human qua human is predicated of Socrates.
[But] the nature of a species does not accrue to human according to the
absolute consideration of human nature, but is among the accidents
that follow according to the being it has in the intellect.74
Thomas is discussing (albeit a bit obliquely) this argument:
(4) Socrates est homo.
(5) Homo est species. Ergo
(6) Socrates est species.
One wants to avoid (6). But Thomas’s view of predication makes this
hard. For Thomas, the copula in a subject-predicate proposition is a sign of
identity secundum rem- a sign that the terms flanking the copula refer to the
same item.75 So for Thomas, this argument’s form is
(7) A = B.
(8) B = C. \
(9) A = C.
Thomas’s account of predication makes (4) through (6) appear valid;
however, his talk of natures lets him deny this. Thomas asserts that (4)
predicates of Socrates the nature as absolutely considered. That is, in (4),
the sense of “homo” includes only what we find in absolute consideration,
a definition. Being a species is a property the nature has not in absolute
consideration, but only in minds. So if (5) is true, the sense of “homo” includes
not just a definition, but a further element appropriate only to concepts. So
the inference is invalid due to equivocation. “Homo” has a different sense in
(4) and (5). Note that this solution does not require ascribing any reality to
absolutely-considered natures precisely as such. It works purely in terms of
terms’ senses.
73. More than this is involved when Thomas speaks of natures as existing in
God’s ideas (e.g., Quodl. 8, 1, 1). But I will not go into divine ideas here.
74. EE 4, 154. See also In II de Anima, l. 12, #380.
75. ST Ia 13, 12 et 85, 5 ad 3; In IV Meta., l. 7, #616.
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ARE NATURES IN PARTICULARS COMMON?
So far, Aquinas’s theory seems to be that species natures exist as tropes, in
matter and mind. Thomas sounds like a “trope” nominalist; however, here,
the plot thickens. For Thomas writes in ST that “a form . . . as it is of itself,
can be received by many . . . unless something else impedes it.”76 This seems
to ascribe a modal property to the nature in itself. No trope can be received
by many. Bearers individuate cases of forms, so that Socrates’ humanity is
essentially Socrates’.77 Nor can a concept be received by many. Concepts
are not received but satisfied. Picking up the notion of satisfaction, another
parsing of the text would read “when you inspect the content of a general
concept, ignoring everything else, it becomes clear that there’s no reason
inherent to that content that there couldn’t be a number of things satisfying
that concept.”78 This makes a claim not about a form as it is of itself, but about
one as it is in the mind, and ascribes the modal property to the concept, in
virtue of its content. But we have inconsistent concepts, concepts nothing
can satisfy. These do not express natures, if natures are things that can have
being extramentally. So it is not true of every concept, as such, that, if you
inspect its content, you find no reason there cannot be many things satisfying
it. It is true only of concepts expressing natures, or of consistent concepts
or concepts of the metaphysically possible. Now, the claim that when you
inspect the content of a consistent general concept, ignoring everything
else, it becomes clear that there is no reason inherent to that content that
there could not be a number of things satisfying that concept is true but
simply tautologous.79 Thomas’s claim does not seem to be a tautology. It
seems to be a significant metaphysical assertion. Thus, this is not likely to
be his meaning. The claim that, when you inspect the content of a concept
of something metaphysically possible, ignoring everything else, it becomes
clear that there’s no reason inherent to that content that there could not
be a number of things satisfying that concept is just false. We do not have
infallible insight into what’s possible based on our grasp of concepts; we can
have and fully grasp a concept of a metaphysically possible item and yet fail
to know that it is possible. (Consider the concepts proof of Goldbach’s conjecture
and disproof of Goldbach’s conjecture.) We ought not saddle Thomas with false
76. ST Ia, 3, 2 ad 3, 17b; see also DV 2, 5 and 2, 6. He had written in EE 4
that “neither unity nor community belong to (a) nature according to its absolute
consideration.” These texts may not contradict. EE ’s point is likely that it is not part of
what we see in absolute consideration of the nature that it actually have instances—
being one common to many is the character of an instanced universal. The point ST
and DV is likely that it is something we see in absolute consideration that a nature is
able to have instances.
77. ST IIIa 77, 2.
78. I owe this suggestion to Jeff Brower.
79. That is, if inspecting the content reveals the absence of inconsistency, and
any inconsistency could be a facet of the content that would prevent its satisfaction.
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theses if we can help it. The claim that, when you inspect the content of a
concept that expresses a nature, ignoring everything else, it becomes clear
that there’s no reason inherent to that content that there couldn’t be a
number of things satisfying that concept is, again, false. We do not know of
every concept that expresses a nature that it does so, just by inspecting the
concept. (Is there a nature, an exemplifiable attribute, of being a proof of
Goldbach’s conjecture?) So even if we know that whatever expresses a nature
can have multiple satisfiers, we do not always know of concepts on this basis
that they can have multiple satisfiers. And in any case, since we do not have
infallible concept-based modal intuitions, there is no reason it cannot turn
out that some concept expresses a nature, yet we fail to know by grasping it
that there can be many things satisfying the concept. Further, this last claim
does not reduce to one of the first two only if talk of expressing a nature-
absolutely-considered-just-as-such is not just a fac¸on de parler—that is, only if
such natures are in some way really available to explain modal attributes of
concepts. Since such natures are not really there, this reading is not open
to us.
Thus our problem seems to remain. The text seems to ascribe a modal
attribute to the nature absolutely considered. But something with no being
of its own ought not to have any properties of its own. Intrinsic modal
properties suggest intrinsic being, and so a strong form of realism. Moreover,
“as it is of itself ” seems to suggest that the modal property is part of what
we would see in absolute consideration. But being exemplifiable is not part
of the definition of any nature, and is not a property one could predicate
of an individual. If Socrates could be received by many, he’d be a species.
De Potentia’s “a nature considered in itself is common,”80 seems to ascribe
the same modal property in different terms, as does In I Sent.’s “every form is
of itself communicable.”81 In I Sent. was probably written in the same period
as EE, the main source for the discussion so far. So we cannot shrug off
the more realist language in ST and DP as suggesting that Thomas simply
changed his theory over time. The disagreement with the account seen thus
far—the apparent realism—has to be merely verbal, else Thomas was wildly
inconsistent. These texts also suggest that Thomas may not mean by being
common the property of being universal, at least in some contexts.82 For
being universal is a semantic property, of representing other items. Only
concepts and linguistic items have such properties for Thomas, and yet he
does not mean that every nature, considered in itself, is a concept or a bit
of language.
80. DP 9, 1, 268. See also ST Ia 7, 1.
81. In I Sent., d. 29, q. 4, a. 2, p. 483.
82. If there is a principled distinction between commonness and universality
in Thomas, his usage sometimes does not reflect it. He sometimes uses “common”
where by my lights he should use “universal” (as, e.g., at DP 3, 16 ad 16, quoted
below). But Thomas is sometimes loose with his terminology.
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Thomas writes again in ST that “every form existing in a singular sup-
posit which individualizes it is common to many, either in reality or at least in
ratio.”83 One might read the text as saying that nothing intrinsic to Socrates’
trope distinguishes it from Plato’s, so that there is in Socrates something we
can pry away from individuating conditions mentally and then imagine cor-
rectly to be in Plato. But this just provides for commonality in ratio; it makes
no sense of the disjunct “in reality.” There are two ways to take the contrast “in
reality or in ratio.” On one, to be common in reality is to be one constituent
in many particular things, and to be common in ratio—“in reason”—is to be
conceivably so. By this, Thomas would presumably mean to suggest “possibly
so”; otherwise, he would just be pointing out that those with [what he thinks
are] false theories of universals may so conceive it. No trope in matter is com-
mon to many either way.84 Thomas denies that numerically-one trope is in
Socrates and Plato.85 Further, as bearers individuate cases of forms, it is im-
possible that Socrates’ trope of humanity be Plato’s. Nor for that matter are
concepts common in reality- they are not constituents of extra-mental things.
A concept might be called common to many in ratio, in that its ratio (content)
represents many. But, then, Thomas’s claim works out to be “every individu-
alized nature is such as to be represented by a universal concept, one ‘com-
mon to many’ in the sense of being such intrinsically as to apply to many.”
This however gives no reading at all for “in reality.” On the second reading, to
be common in reality is to be numerically the same form in distinct individu-
alizing supposits, as happens only in the Trinity, and to be common “in ratio”
is to be common in whatever way natures are common in distinct particular
things. But it is just false that every individualized form is actually common
to many in this way: some species have just one member. One might take the
claim as that every such form is represented by a universal concept. This,
again, is probably false, as probably some kinds have never been observed
by us or any other non-divine mind that employs such concepts.86
The question of how something with no being of its own can have a
modal property suggests an analogy: perhaps Thomas’s nature in itself is
like Thomist prime matter.87 Like prime matter, it cannot exist on its own
in reality, but can be considered on its own, absolutely. Perhaps like prime
matter, when considered absolutely, its only intrinsic features are modal—it
is “pure potentiality” to exist in diverse material and mental incarnations. For
the nature of humans is intrinsically apt to confer human nature on matter
83. ST Ia 13, 9, 86b.
84. See again ST IIIa 77, 2.
85. EE 4; QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 9; In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2.
86. Every creature is observed by God, of course, but it does not seem likely that
Thomas means to bring in the divine mind here: he does so nowhere else in his
theory of attributes, save in Quodlibet (henceforth Quodl.) 8, 1, 1, where the issue is
directly one about God’s ideas.
87. I could not have hit on this had I not read Spade, “Degrees of Being,”
pp. 259–60.
22 BRIAN LEFTOW
and in minds and perhaps its definition captures not what it intrinsically
is but what it is intrinsically apt to confer. While the prime matter of all
sublunar material things is in a sense one, according to Thomas, the sense
is simply that what distinguishes the prime matter of some earth from that
of some water is not anything proper to prime matter, but consists entirely
in “formal” factors.88 Similarly, perhaps, the sense in which the nature of all
humans is one may be simply that what makes humans’ tropes of humanity
distinct consists entirely in factors outside the nature absolutely considered-
the clumps of matter receiving them.
This would ascribe to the absolutely-considered nature a “real but less
than numerical unity,” au Scotus, and yet also a lack of intrinsic positive
unity to go with its lack of intrinsic positive being, as Aquinas’s doctrine of
the “convertibility” of ens and unum demands. But this analogy will not help
Aquinas much. Thomas’ account of substance-generation requires the same
prime matter to exist in different substances. But notoriously, his system does
not really let this be so, save in the “privative” sense just mentioned.89 This
analogy would leave it as unclear that two particulars can really have the same
nature as it is that they can really have the same prime matter in some sense
beyond the privative. But Thomas explicitly considers and rejects the claim
that the merely privative unity of prime matter makes it a good analogue of
the unity a common nature provides: “Prime matter is said to be one not
because it has one form, as man is one by the unity of one form, but by the
removal of all distinguishing forms.”90 The unity having a nature in common
provides is positive, not negative. In any case, few care to follow Thomas in
believing that there can be such a thing as a material pure potentiality. So
the analogy would hardly help his position’s credibility. Further, while we
can make sense of the substantial forms that might actualize prime matter’s
potentiality, it is hard to see how “material trope” and “mental trope” could
serve as quasi-forms actualizing the nature’s quasi-pure-potentiality. Finally,
if the nature absolutely considered were a prime matter analogue in tropes,
it would not be true that “Human nature is not found in individuals with
88. ST Ia 16, 7 ad 2.
89. On Thomas’s account, when some water turns to air, all the water was nothing
but water, there being but one substantial form in any batch of stuff (so de Mixtione
Elementorum). So, too, all the air is nothing but air. Remove a substance’s substantial
form, and not one bit of it survives, on Thomas’ terms. So not one bit of the water
exists once its substantial form is gone. Thus, on Thomas’s terms, not one actual bit
of water or air is common to the two bodies of stuff. At most, one could say that the
subelemental matter of the water is the matter of the air. This is what Aquinas’s asserts
in claiming that the two batches of stuff have the same prime matter. But if prime
matter is just a pure potentiality for existing under substantial form, this can only
mean that the pure potentiality to be some stuff that the water realized is realized also
by the air. This is so, surely, only if something carries that very potentiality from one
batch of stuff into another. On Thomas’s terms, not one bit of actual stuff survives
to do so. So it is just not clear how this could come about.
90. ST Ia 16, 7 ad 2, 119b.
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such a unity as to be one thing belonging to whoever is human.”91 For sub-
lunary prime matter does have such a unity as to be one thing in whatever is
sublunary and material, albeit a unity of a negative sort.
INCONSISTENCY THREATENS AGAIN
With the realist language added, Wolterstorff finds Thomas’ view inconsis-
tent:
If human nature is the nature both of Socrates and of Plato, then is the
nature of Socrates identical with the nature of Plato? To this question,
Aquinas answers “no.” But surely the answer must be “Yes.” . . . If human
nature is the nature of Socrates and also the nature of Plato, then the
nature of Socrates is identical with the nature of Plato. On the other
hand if “the nature of Socrates” and “the nature of Plato” . . . refer to dif-
ferent things, then neither (stands) for that nature which is supposedly
the nature of both. Then it is false that human nature is the nature of
Socrates and . . . of Plato.92
Wolterstorff reads Thomas as holding that
(10) Socrates’ nature = human nature,
(11) Plato’s nature = human nature,
(12) human nature = human nature, and yet
(13) Socrates’ nature = Plato’s nature.
(10), (11) and (12) are Wolterstorff’s interpretation of the claim that
human nature is common to Socrates and Plato. And, indeed, (10) through
(13) are jointly inconsistent. But I want to suggest that Thomas in fact rejects
(10) and (11).
As Thomas sees it, Socrates’ nature is not human nature simpliciter. It is
Socrates’ human nature: everything in Socrates is individuated. Thus, Thomas
rejects (10). Yet, as Socrates is human, there is also a sense in which Socrates
has human nature simpliciter. This threatens Thomas with a redundancy.
One surely does not want to say that Socrates has both Socrates’ human
nature and another discrete trope, human nature simpliciter. Aquinas’ way
out emerges when we link several texts:
To the truth of something’s nature considered in common pertain
its form and matter taken in common. To the truth of the nature
91. EE 4, 154.
92. Wolterstorff, Universals, p. 146. See also John Fox, “Truthmaker,” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 65 (1987): 193.
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considered in this particular pertain individual signate matter and form
individuated by this sort of matter. Just so, a human soul and body is of
the truth of human nature in common; but this soul and this body is of
the truth of human nature in Peter and Martin.93
“Human nature in Peter” is surely Peter’s trope of human nature. The con-
tent of Peter’s human nature is “this soul and this body.” This is identified
with “signate matter” and “form individuated” by it. Elsewhere, Thomas calls
this sort of thing the singular essence94: “A singular essence is constituted
from designated matter and individuated form, as Socrates’ essence from
this body and this soul.”95 So, it appears that Thomas identifies Peter’s sin-
gular essence with Peter’s trope of humanity. To be Peter is to have Peter’s
soul in Peter’s body. To have “human nature in common” is to have some
soul and some body, the text tells us. Thomas also writes that,
Just as it is of the nature [ratio] of this human that it is composed of this
soul, this flesh and these bones, so it so of the nature of human beings
generally to be of soul and flesh and bones. For whatever is commonly
of the substance of all the individuals contained under a species must
be of the substance of the species.96
Here, Thomas treats the singular essence as logically prior to the general
essence: because each individual human has by nature his/her soul and
his/her body, the general human nature is to have soul and body- or a soul
and a body. (The Latin can, of course, be read either way.) This suggests
the following picture: to be this human is to have this soul and this body. To
be some human is to have some individual soul and body. We get much the
same picture in another place:
“Picked out” [signatam] matter . . . under definite dimensions . . . is not
put into the definition of the human qua human, but would be put in
Socrates’ definition if Socrates had one. Matter which is not picked out
is put in the definition of the human: not . . . this bone and this flesh, but
bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-picked-out matter of the
human. It is clear therefore that the essence of human and the essence
of Socrates differ only according to picked-out and not-picked-out.97
93. ST Ia 119, 1, 705b.
94. I suggest that Thomas sees these as equivalent because they include the recipe
for the body: given appropriate signate matter plus a human soul, a human body
results.
95. SCG I 65. See also ST Ia 119, 1; Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate 5, 3;
Compendium Theologiae 154; Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2; DV 2, 7.
96. ST Ia 75, 4, 442b.
97. EE 2–3, 148.
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“This” is a demonstrative. It does the picking out Thomas discusses. Peter
has human nature by having Peter’s human nature because by having what
makes one this human, one has what makes one some human. Being this
human entails being some human; no further truthmaker for “is some hu-
man,” that is, “has human nature,” is needed. Socrates’ human nature is not
identical with common human nature: Thomas denies (10) and (11). All
the same, by having his human nature, Socrates has common human nature,
that is, has what makes it true that Socrates is human, not just this human.
The existential quantifier “some” can be glossed disjunctively: if being
an animal consists in having some animal species-nature, and FGH are all
the animal species, being an animal consists in being F or being G or being
H. Here we can usefully bring in a comparison Thomas makes:
the essence of human and the essence of Socrates differ only according
to the picked out and the not-picked-out . . . just as the essence of the
genus and the essence of the species differ according to picked-out
and not picked out, though the mode of picking-out differs in the two
cases . . . the nature of the species is indeterminate in respect of the
individual just as the nature of the genus is in respect of the species;
whence it is that just as that which is a genus, just as predicated of the
species, implies in its signification, though indistinctly, all that which is
determinately in the species; so that which is a species, according as it
is predicated of an individual, should signify all that is essentially in the
individual (granted, indistinctly).98
As we saw earlier, for Thomas, genus-concepts are in effect disjunctive. “Is an
animal” means “is some species of animal” and so is equivalent to “is a dog or
a cat or.” Thomas parallels the genus/species and the species/individual re-
lationships. This suggests that species-concepts too are in effect disjunctive,
and have their unity by a sort of indeterminacy among the disjuncts.99 One
satisfies a disjunctive concept by satisfying a disjunct, without any further
truthmaker needed. If species/genus parallels individual/species, and both
differ by a sort of “designation,” we can suggest that by having this human
nature, one has some human nature (as by having this species one has some
species, and so belongs to a genus). For Thomas, “——— is human” predi-
cates “has a human nature,” and so in effect predicates “has Peter’s human
nature or Paul’s or, etc.” It is as if this disjunction is its contribution to the
truth-condition of a sentence. And, so it is clear, that, while Peter’s human
nature is not identical with human nature simpliciter, by having Peter’s, Peter
has human nature simpliciter.
A natural question to raise here is just how Thomas’s treatments of
species and genera differ. If, in a sense, infima species are also disjunctive,
one can wonder whether Thomas is as reductionist about infima species as
98. EE 3, 148, 151.
99. This is clear in another text below.
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he is about species that are also genera. I think he is not. Infima-species-
concepts always apply in virtue of tropes with no kind-differences between
them, tropes that are simpliciter of the same kind. They represent the tropes
due to which they apply directly, with complete definiteness and without
indetermination. No higher species-concept that is also a genus-concept
does so. Genera by definition have some indeterminacy of content, which
lower species-concepts resolve. They leave it open to which lower kinds
items to which they’re applied belong. Thomas is reductionist about genera
in that on his account, to fall under a genus-concept is in effect to fall
under a disjunction of lower species-concepts, and the information genus-
concepts provide reduces to information about disjunctions of lower species-
concepts. No parallel reduction is available for lowest species-concepts, by
definition.100 The parallel point in rebus is that no reduction of lowest species
tropes into disjunctions of tropes of still lower species is available.
If having common human nature is just having some individual human
nature, this makes sense of Aquinas’s claim that we can abstract one and the
same nature, human nature simpliciter, from Socrates or Plato. Wolterstorff
finds Thomas’ claim unacceptable:
One can . . . abstract the nature of Socrates and abstract the nature
of Plato. But then two distinct things have been abstracted . . . not
one . . . thing, human nature . . . if one can indeed abstract human na-
ture both from Socrates and from Plato, then there must be one thing,
human nature, there to be abstracted from both . . . . If one is abstrac-
tively attending to the nature of Plato and . . . of Socrates, then one is
abstractively attending to either one thing or two . . . . The activity of at-
tending to one thing and ignoring the different accidental traits which
may have accrued to it must not be confused with the activity of attend-
ing to two similar things and ignoring their differences.101
So, too, Fox: “This notion of abstraction gives rise to many problems. Like-
ness cannot be transmuted to identity either by inattention or by paring off
difference. If two things are simply distinct there is no one thing that can
be ‘abstracted’ from both.”102 But, to abstract common human nature is to
do something a bit like quantifying existentially. Thomas writes that, “what-
ever is commonly of the substance of all the individuals contained under a
species must be of the substance of the species.” We can take this as a recipe
for inferring (“abstracting”) species-definitions, that is, common natures: if
for all Fs, to be x = to consist of this A and this B, then to be an F is to consist
100. A reduction to disjunctions of individuals would forfeit information. If
“Socrates is human” asserts only that Socrates is one of Peter or Paul or . . . , then
it does not tell what feature qualifies particulars for membership in this particular
disjunction.
101. Wolterstorff, Universals, p. 148.
102. Fox, “Truthmaker,” p. 193.
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of some A and some B. Where a nature cannot be given in compositional
terms, other, similar recipes are available.
While Thomas’s realist language need not make his position incon-
sistent, it is still hard even to see what it can mean. Realists who say that
humans have human nature in common mean that the same item, human
nature, is present in all humans: humans have something like a constituent
in common.103 But Thomas rejects the claim that numerically one nature
is in Socrates and Plato.104 For him, “no commonness is found in Socrates.
Rather, whatever is in him is individuated.”105 What is in Socrates is Socrates’
humanity.106 So, though Socrates and Plato are both human, Socrates’ hu-
man nature = Plato’s. If all this is true, what can it mean to say that human
nature is common to Socrates and Plato, beyond that the same (disjunc-
tive) universal concept applies to both? It should be clear that the roughly-
existential-quantification account is not enough to explain the real com-
monness of human nature on its own. Socrates is part of the set of all and
only those who instance human nature. He is also part of the set of all and
only humans and cats. Consider our species-definition formula, that if for
all Fs, to be x = to consist of this A and this B, then to be an F is to consist
of some A and some B: it is true for every member of this latter set that
to be x is to consist of this body and this soul. Then equally, to be a mem-
ber of this set is to consist of some (cat or human) body and some (cat or
human) soul. However, we do not think there is a really common nature
of cat-humanity. Beyond anything the roughly-existential-quantification ac-
count provides, we need some reason to treat the set of humans and others
relevantly like it as specifying a common nature’s extension, and treat others
like the set of cats and humans as arbitrary and unnatural. That is, we need
this if we, like Thomas, are committed to the claim that not every such set
gives the extension of a genuine objective kind. The real commonness of
human nature is what makes the relevant set the extension of a natural kind.
It is something which binds some tropes (and their bearers) into a unity
other sets of tropes (and bearers) lack.
CATEGORY-MISTAKES AND REINTERPRETATIONS
Aquinas allows two ways of talking about or considering a nature, “abso-
lutely” and in its instances. He holds that “the nature . . . absolutely consid-
ered abstracts from any existence.” That is, when one absolutely considers
103. E.g., Gustav Bergmann, Logic and Reality (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1964), and Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism.
104. EE 4; QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 9; In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2.
105. EE 4, 154.
106. ST Ia, 3, 2 ad 3.
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a nature, one cannot properly say that it exists.107 “Existent” or “existent
thing” are not part of any nature’s definition, and one can ascribe to a
nature absolutely considered only what occurs in its definition. Even if “ex-
istent” did occur in a definition, further, this would mean only that being
existent was part of the essence of items satisfying the definition, not that
the essence itself had some sort of intrinsic being. This latter point shows
us that part of the point of his regimentation of talk about the nature is to
make it impossible even to make this Platonist claim, since one obviously
cannot make it by talking about the nature as exemplified.
Now “non-existent” is not part of any nature’s definition either. But if
Thomas could not say that the nature has no intrinsic being, he could not
deny Platonism. His way to say that the nature has no intrinsic being is to say
(a) the nature has existence only in its instances, and
(b) it is not intrinsic to the nature to exist in any of these instances.
Here, (a) is clearly a claim about the nature’s being in its instances—that the
being it has here and here and here adds up to all the being it has. So it is
clearly compatible with Aquinas’s regimentation of nature-talk. One could
take (b) as a claim about what occurs in a nature’s definition, that these
attributes do not include the further attribute of existing in such or such
an instance. (Surely if one can say what is in a definition when speaking in
the absolute-consideration mode, one can also say what is not.) One might
instead take (b) as a claim about the nature’s being in its instances, that this
being is not intrinsic. Now, if it is compatible with his regimentation to assert
(b) so taken, presumably it is also compatible with it to assert ¬(b) so taken.
Yet, even doing so would not assert Platonism. Suppose that the nature’s be-
ing in a particular instance were intrinsic to it. This might show that natures
have accidental intrinsics, which would hardly imply that they exist on their
own. If one rejected that, it would follow that it is part of the nature to have
this instance and so exist. But this would not entail that the nature could exist
apart from any instance, or has any being it does not derive from its instances.
Even if we take (b) as saying that the nature’s being in its instances is not in-
trinsic, and so as allowing as licit (though false) the claim that it is intrinsic,
it would remain the case that Thomas had made Platonism unassertable.
One can consider a nature only either absolutely or “as it has existence
in this or in that.” If one cannot both consider a nature absolutely and say
that it exists, the only way to say that it exists is to speak of it “as it has existence
in this or that.” For the nature to have existence in this or that is for this
or that to have that nature. To say that a nature “has existence in this or
that” is to say that it has instances- which one can gloss as there being borne
tropes of the sort a particular nature-concept predicates, if one wants to be
107. This point (which I saw independently) is also in Gracia, “Cutting the
Gordian Knot,” 28.
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careful about avoiding commitment to natures absolutely considered. So,
on Thomas’s view, “human nature exists” means that there are humanness-
tropes, in matter or mind. On his terms, this is all “human nature exists” can
mean. To speak of the nature as existing in any other sense is to commit a
category-mistake.108 It is to try to say something this regimentation denies
any sense—to speak of a nature as if it were a concrete particular thing.
If existing is a matter of having instances, so is existing in any particular
number. So for Thomas, “the nature is one” means that it has one instance,
mental or material, and “the nature is many” means that it has many: “if, then,
one is asked whether the nature considered absolutely can be called one or
many . . . either can happen to it . . . it is one according as it is in Socrates
(and it) is multiplied in many.”109 The only way to answer “one or many?” is
to talk about instances. Given Aquinas’ general tie between being and unity,
one would expect as much.110 This explains the peculiar argument he gives
to “prove” that the nature absolutely considered is not one or many:
If plurality were of its proper content, it could never be one, as it is in
Socrates. Similarly, if unity were of its . . . proper content, then the nature
of Socrates and Plato would be one and the same, and it could not be
made many in many.111
One wants to say that this is missing the point: the nature, like every item,
is one, and no single thing can be many.112 But Thomas is committed to
the claim that the only way to talk about the nature’s existence or number-
properties is to talk about instances. So this peculiar argument embodies
the only way he can consistently interpret the “one or many?” question.
Before turning to how this parsing of nature-talk affects the common-
ness of natures, let me consider three objections. Edwards argues that
Thomas cannot say only this that, in addition to explicating “human na-
ture is n in number” as “human nature has n instances,” Thomas must also
call human nature one in some other way:
There must . . . be a sense in which the nature as such is one in itself, for
it is distinct from other natures . . . . Humanity is not caninity, what it is
108. To call it a nature, or the nature of a particular, would similarly be a mistake
if we are speaking of the nature absolutely considered. It would ascribe to the nature
viewed abstractly a property it can have only in particulars. (Of course it is a nature in
particulars.) Likewise, one cannot call it definable as that is a property natures have
only in minds. Pannier and Sullivan suggest that Thomas does inconsistently ascribe
natures absolutely considered such properties (“Aquinas’ Solution,” pp. 164–66),
but I do not see that the text supports them.
109. EE 4, 153.
110. See e.g. ST Ia 11, 1.
111. EE 4, 153.
112. Wolterstorff, Universals, pp. 147–48; Pannier and Sullivan, “Aquinas’ Solu-
tion,” pp. 163–64.
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to be human is not what it is to be a dog (and this would be the same
even if the two natures had the same instances or if they had none).113
But the claim that humanity is not caninity does not even imply that human-
ity exists. It is also true if there is no such thing as abstract humanity as such:
if there is none, it has no properties, including non-identity with caninity. If
the nature considered absolutely does not exist as such, Thomas can make
just this flat-footed response to Edwards. This move leaves Thomas the re-
sources to say what is true about human and canine natures. For nothing
keeps him from saying that no human is the same in species as any dog, or
that God’s ideas of creatures are such that if there were humans, none would
be the same in species as any dog, or that nothing which satisfies “———
is human” by so doing satisfies “——— is a dog.” Since we have broached
the subject of category-mistakes, it might also be worth noting that Aquinas
could deny both “humanity = caninity” and “humanity = caninity” were he
willing to call both category-mistakes.
It can also seem in another way that Thomas must grant that human
nature, apart from instances or minds, is itself one of something. For surely
(you may say) human nature = human nature. And surely all things with the
property of being human nature are identical with human nature. But if for
some x all the Fs are identical with x, there is just one F. I reply again on
Thomas’ behalf that if there is no such thing as human nature absolutely
considered just as such, then nothing is identical with it, either. Of course,
this move requires Thomas to deny too that humanity = humanity. This is
acceptable. If there is no Santa Claus, nothing is identical with Santa, and
if that is so, then surely it is not true in particular that Santa = Santa. There
is some pull in the opposite direction. Some want to call “Santa = Santa”
true regardless. But that way lies Meinong. And nothing keeps Thomas from
saying that any individual human’s humanity is self-identical.
Finally, Edwards also argues that Thomas’ nature must
as such [have] its own unity [because] Aquinas holds that there is a real
distinction between any individual and the nature it has . . . his nature
is independent of Socrates in the sense that it does not have to exist
in this individual. No individual is part of its intelligible structure. And
the intelligible structure of an individual as an individual . . . contains
more than its nature. (This) distinction is real in the sense that it is
discovered . . . not manufactured by the mind.114
Edwards asserts that Socrates’ nature doesn’t have to exist in Socrates, that
neither Socrates nor anyone else is part of its “intelligible structure.” Now,
if what she has in mind is Socrates’ individual human nature, her claim is
113. Edwards, “Realism,” p. 83.
114. Edwards, “Realism,” pp. 85–86.
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obviously false. Thus, she must have it in mind that Socrates’ nature is hu-
manness absolutely considered, in whose definition no individual figures.
But the real distinction Thomas asserts is between an individual and its own
trope of its nature. A real distinction between individual and nature abso-
lutely considered would require two real terms, but Thomas does not clearly
assert any such thing. Instead, he uses the fact that definitions do not men-
tion individuals to argue the claim that material individuals contain more
than just a nature-trope.115 Again, an individual’s “intelligible structure” may
be signate matter plus an individualized form, or plus a nature-trope, or the
equivalent of the soul+body account of human nature in Peter discussed
above, per the texts above. If it is, no commitment to an abstract nature ab-
solutely considered with its own unity is needed. It is certainly possible that
human nature exist while Socrates does not, for it is possible that humans
exist while he does not. But it is not clear that Thomas needs any more than
this latter common-sense fact plus the roughly-existential-quantification ac-
count of common human nature given above to explicate the way Socrates’
nature is independent of Socrates.
HOW NATURES IN REBUS ARE COMMON
To Thomas, for a nature to exist is for there to be tropes in mind or matter.
For it not to exist is for it to be no such tropes in mind or matter.116 For
it to be many is for it to have many tropes in matter or mind. For it to be
one is for there to be just one such trope. As Thomas sees it, all non-modal
properties a nature has which its definition does not include are properties
it has in mental or extra-mental instances- that is, properties of tropes. So I
suggest that for Thomas, ascribing these properties to the nature is really a
way to talk about properties of tropes and bearers. Being common, Thomas
argues, is not part of a nature’s definition. Were being common part of
the definition of “human,” then only common things would be humans;
yet Socrates is both human and not common.117 Thomas must thus parse
a nature’s being common in terms of some property of its instances. To be
common is to be one in many. To be common as attributes are supposed
to be is to make many one. So Thomas must parse a species-nature’s being
common in terms of something about its tropes which makes their bearers
one, in particular one in species, or else makes them one as mental tropes of
115. E.g., ST Ia 3, 3.
116. It might seem to follow that all possible natures always exist, since they are
always in the mind of God. But this does not follow: it requires a realism about
divine ideas and their contents that Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity disallows
or, rather, all natures “exist” there eternally only in the sense (discussed earlier) that
God eternally knows all truths about them.
117. EE 4, 153–54.
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(representing) the same nature are one, or one as mental and extramental
tropes are.
Aquinas’s account of intentionality and concept-formation provides the
story about how mental and extra-mental tropes are one: they are one be-
cause the trope occurring in the mind represents tropes (and so their bear-
ers) outside the mind. Mental tropes make minds one with external objects
by uniting the mind with those objects’ natures118; they unite mind and ob-
ject by representing the nature within the mind.119 Here, commonness is
really a matter of representation. I take it that representations of the same
nature are one—that is, the same type of representation—by representing
the same nature. Their unity is routed through that of the nature they rep-
resent, and so parasitic on it. The real question, then, is how natures make
extramental particulars of the same kind one.
One might piggyback an account of this on the link between mind and
the extramental, and say that natures make particulars of the same kind one
by making them such as to be represented by the same mental tropes.120 A
text in Aquinas’ Metaphysics commentary suggests this:
certain . . . things are called one . . . of which there is one understanding,
which the soul apprehends by one apprehension . . . by a single con-
cept (apprehensio indivisibilis). This happens (with) that which is one
in species . . . what is indivisible in species is one . . . according to under-
standing and conception. For there is not in distinct singular things
some numerically single nature one can call a species. But the intellect
apprehends as one that in which all a nature’s instances (inferiores) agree.
And so the species which really is diverse in diverse individuals becomes
indivisible in the intellect’s grasp.121
Presumably Thomas does not want to say that things wait to be one in species
for some intellect to abstract their common concept. The text suggests rather
that being one in species is being one “according to understanding and
conception,” that is, being representable by a single species-concept. Pre-
sumably this cashes out as something like: just if Socrates is of the same
species as Plato, an intellect abstracting a species-concept from Socrates
forms “the same concept” it would have formed had it abstracted one from
118. ST Ia 14, 1–2.
119. DV 2, 3 ad 9 et 5 ad 5; DV 8, 1c et 11, ad 3; In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, a. 1c et ad 7.
120. This would have to be explicated as “token tropes,” not “tropes of the same
trope-kind,” at least if one wants also to use the account of sameness of kind among
mental tropes just given. Otherwise, one would have a circle, that what makes repre-
sented trope-bearers to be of the same kind is that the tropes which represent them
are of the same kind, and what makes the representing tropes to be of the same kind
is that the bearers they represent are of the same kind.
121. S. Thomae Aquinatis In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria (Turin: Marietti,
1935), on Book Ten (henceforth cited in such forms as In X Meta.), l. 1, #1929–30,
p. 556.
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Plato instead—that is, one with that concept’s very content, one representing
“the same species.” And the suggestion on offer is that we take this to define
what it is for particulars species-concepts can represent to be one in species.
Now “the very content” raises a question: content of the same type, or
token-identical content? If we say “type-identical,” we face immediately the
question of what makes contents one in type. If we want to say that what
makes particulars have the same nature is being representable by concepts
with the same type of content, we cannot also adopt the intuitive suggestion
above that what makes concepts have the same type of content is represent-
ing the same nature. So, we should take Thomas’ thesis as that the content
we get from Socrates is not just type, but token-identical with one we would
have obtained from Plato. This seems to be good Thomas- the concepts
embody numerically the same nature- and also to accord with intuition.
This given, one could “define” Thomas’s same-species relation as Lewis
“defines” theoretical terms: the same–species relation is that relation R be-
tween substances such that for all xy, Rxy iff the contents of a human intel-
lect’s species-concepts of x and y would be token-identical, this fact repre-
sents R’s obtaining, and R is not a likeness—, numerical, or causal relation.
This does not define the relation in terms of contingent properties. How
the human intellect works is a function of human nature, and so necessary.
So then is how the human intellect would interact with substances standing
in a same-species relation. Further, on this account, the relation holds due
to a causal power with which the nature (the relation’s foundation) en-
dows particulars by necessity, to produce a certain effect in the considering
mind. To take such a power as the same-species relation’s proximate foun-
dation would fit Aquinas’ account of relations, because it assigns sameness
of species a foundation in one of the categories of relation-foundations
Thomas adopted from Aristotle, that of “action and passion.”122 We might
simply identify the relation’s obtaining with the related things’ both having
this power. Thomas probably would not; he does not identify relations with
their foundations.
One could take this as Aquinas’ account of how natures make
particulars one. However, the In X Meta. text might give a proprium of
the same-species relation (or its obtaining), not an account of its inner
constitution. If it gives the relation’s inner constitution, then if there were
no determinate facts about what intellects would do were they on the scene,
no extramental particulars would be one in species. This is unintuitive. It is
not hard to imagine a world in which there are no such facts. Suppose that
there is no God, the world runs in part by irreducibly indeterministic laws
operating on partly-chance conditions, and the emergence of minds and
their precise tendencies if they existed are both functions of irreducibly
indeterminist laws and chancy conditions. In this case, which many believe
actual, if there were no minds, there would be no facts about just how
122. ST Ia 13, 7; ST Ia 28, 4; In V Meta., l. 17, ##1023–25.
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minds would represent the world, even granting that they (by chance)
emerge. But, if there were two paramecia early in such a world, surely they
would be one in species while they existed, before any minds existed, and
even if no minds ever emerged, however precisely we cash this out.
More to the point, routing the commonness of natures through how
they would be represented rests it on a dispositional property. Dispositional
properties have categorical bases. So we should ask if Thomas has an account
of something that would provide such a base. Well, you might say, the reason
Fido would be represented by a dog-concept is that he has a dog-trope as
his species-trope, and so too for Spot. This sort of same-kind relation rests
immediately on the tropes involved.123 Yet what is it about Fido’s trope being
one of dog and Spot’s trope being one of dog that makes Fido and Spot
generate the same concept? The answers here seem limited to “that’s just
how it is- you’ve struck bedrock” or “well, these tropes make Fido and Spot
the same kind of animal.” The latter answer is more natural and plausible,
but requires Thomas to give an account of same-kind relations between
particulars. This other account might yield a nondispositional account of
the same-species relation that would equally make it supervene immediately
on the tropes involved and permit a simpler account of how kind-tropes
make particulars one. I think Thomas has a further account, and that it
does involve this supervenience.
We have seen Thomas say both that natures are common extramen-
tally and that nothing in Socrates is common. Both are true if a nature has
commonness extramentally but not in Socrates. I now try to show that for
Thomas, it does. My first step in doing so is to look a bit further at how
Thomas can interpret the claim “human nature is common.”
For Thomas, human nature in some sense has whiteness accidentally
by being in Socrates.124 If being in a white thing suffices for being acciden-
tally white, then being in a thing married to Xanthippe suffices for being
accidentally married to Xanthippe. So, on Thomas’s terms, human nature
is married to Xanthippe. Still, it might not be quite right to say that human
nature has this property in Socrates. For being married is not something in
Socrates, though he is married. We would not call it an intrinsic property
of Socrates, as we think of intrinsic attributes as (very roughly) those an
item could have if the universe ended at its skin.125 Rather, Socrates’ being
married consists in his standing in certain relations to Xanthippe and to
social institutions.126 And so it might be better to say that human nature is
accidentally married to Xanthippe in a situation or a whole (a couple in a
123. I show shortly why this matters.
124. EE 4, 153.
125. Limits of space preclude my trying to work out a more careful account of
intrinsicness. I take it that this covers the main sorts of intuition such accounts must
catch.
126. Here, an objection might arise: our idea that “intrinsic” and “relational”
are mutually exclusive stems in part from our Russellian picture of relations, on
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society) that includes Socrates and Xanthippe. Thomas, in fact, holds that
of all the Aristotelian intrinsic categories, only relation fails as such to posit
something in its bearers—that is, to make a genuine intrinsic difference:
“what it predicates is not something but to something.”127
Thus there might be a tenable distinction between attributes a na-
ture might have accidentally “in” its instances and others it might have
accidentally and extra-mentally but not “in” its instances, the latter being
those it has due to certain relations its instances stand in. If there is, Thomas
could appeal to it, and say that human nature is common due not to some-
thing “in” any human, but to relations between humans. So I suggest that
for Thomas, a nature is common iff its instances are one in species, and
this in turn is so iff its instances stand in a same-species-as relation. That
its instances stand in a same-species relation might be for Thomas what we
“really” assert in saying that the nature is common. And this might in turn
provide an interpretation of what appear to be the modal attributes purely
of the nature taken absolutely.
Let us therefore see what Thomas means by the claim that
(S) Socrates and Plato are the same in species.
Thomas insists that identity of species is a real and not a merely conceptual
relation: “The relation the term “same” expresses . . . is of reason alone if
it is taken as “simply the same.” . . . It is not so when things are said to be
the same not in number but in generic or specific nature.”128 The relation
exists in the world. It is not an artifact of the mind. And this means both
that the basis of the relation exists in the world and that the relation itself is
which they are single entities somehow “between” their terms. Thomas worked with
an Aristotelian picture of relations, on which Socrates’ being married to Xanthippe
consists not in there being a single relation, marriage, linking the two, but in Socrates’
having the accident of being married to Xanthippe and Xanthippe’s having the ac-
cident of being married to Socrates. On such a picture, do not relations come out
as intrinsic as other attributes? Aquinas, in fact, groups relation, substance, quantity,
and quality as “intrinsic” attributes, dubbing those of Aristotle’s other six categories
extrinsic (In V Met., l. 9, #892). Yet, I would argue that the short answer is “no”:
medieval philosophers (and Aristotle) had the intuitions we express by saying that
relations are not intrinsic, and these both complicated Aristotelian accounts of rela-
tions (e.g., ST Ia 13, 7 and In V. Meta., l. 17) and led gradually to dissatisfaction with
them. Mark Henninger tells this story in Relations (N.Y.: Oxford University Press,
1989).
127. DV 1, 5 ad 16. See also ST Ia 28, 1; In I Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 1 and d. 20, q. 1, a.
1; Quodl. 1, 2 and 9, 4. Thomas’ point more precisely is that the sheer facts that an
attribute is relational and A has it do not entail that A is intrinsically different than
it might have been, while if an attribute is in the categories of substance, quantity
and quality, then if A has it, it follows that A is intrinsically different than it might
have been. For instance, some relations are purely “of reason” (e.g., DP 7, 11).
128. ST Ia 28, 1 ad 2, 187b.
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something extra-mentally real.129 One might think that if (S) does not rest
on one item, a universal, literally being in Socrates and Plato, or purely and
simply on the fact that Socrates and Plato are such as to be represented by the
same species-concepts, (S) can mean only that Socrates and Plato are alike
in certain ways. According to Copleston, for Thomas, “members of a species
possess similar substantial forms . . . this objective similarity . . . enables us to
have universal specific concepts, and so to apply the same universal term to
all the members of a specific class.”130 One might, in other words, think that
sameness in species can only be likeness founded on species-tropes; however,
Thomas explicitly rejects treating sameness of species as likeness. He accepts
from Aristotle that “that is the same which is one in substance, the similar is
the one in quality.”131 Sharing a species is being one in what Aristotle called
a secondary substance.132 So for Thomas, being one in species is a mode of
identity, not likeness.133 Now sometimes Thomas can seem to see less than
an absolute difference here:
When there is unity according to the whole nature (ratio) of the species,
“identity” is said; when there is unity not according to the whole nature
of the species, “likeness” is said . . . things generically one are similar;
things one in species are identical.134
A natural thought here would be that if unity according to part of the species
is likeness, unity according to that part plus the other parts is also likeness.
But if sharing a part is just overlap, it does not follow that sharing all parts is
just overlap; sharing all parts may be not “just” overlap but identity. There
are no genus tropes, and infima species tropes are indivisible save in concept.
Two dogs on Thomas’ account bear kind-tropes that are distinct only because
they inform distinct clumps of matter. If there are no real tropes for higher
species, dogs and cats do not as such have any sort of trope of which this is
true. There may be some principled distinction to be drawn between a case
entailing having a trope “in common” and a case not entailing this.
Now it would not be unreasonable to reply here that sameness of kind
is just perfect likeness—that the difference between the relevant relation
between dogs and the relevant relation between dogs and cats is one of
degree, not kind. However, we saw earlier that for Thomas, likeness always
rests on some “agreement of form,” and that, on pain of regress, we cannot
construe this agreement as another likeness. Now sometimes it is hard to
129. As versus the case of numerical self-identity, where the basis of the relation
is in the world but the relation itself exists only in the mind (DP 7, 11 ad 3).
130. Copleston, Aquinas, p. 94. I believe that John of St. Thomas reads Thomas
basically this way.
131. In X Meta., l. 4, #1999, p. 571. See also In V Meta., l. 17, #1022.
132. Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a15–19.
133. In X Meta., l. 4, ##2005, 2009; In V Meta., l. 11, #911.
134. In X Meta., l. 4, #2009, pp. 572–73.
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see what else Aquinas leaves room for this agreement to be. In the case of
generic likeness, there is no sort of trope dogs and cats have in common as
such, and so all we can say is that dogs and cats are alike in species though
not the same in species. But where the agreement can be something more
than a likeness, Thomas is committed to taking it to be. So for Thomas,
the likeness of two dogs rests on an agreement between them which is not
just another likeness. And there is some intuitive pull to Thomas’s view
here. We do want to say that dogs are as such in some way “the same.” And
we do see this as being or resting on some sort of relation between their
kinds.
What is the same-species relation? Thomas writes that “one-
ness in substance makes identity . . . oneness in quality causes similar-
ity . . . similarly . . . being one in quantity causes equality.”135 The parallel sug-
gests that he sees the cases as similar. And, at least in the case of quantity and
quality, Thomas is fairly explicit about what sameness of species is. Thomas
writes in In I Sent. that the differentia of equality is having one quantity136 and
that having one quantity means more precisely having “the same species”
of quantity.137 For Thomas, there is no real difference between differentiae
and their species. So equality for Thomas is the same-species relation for
quantities.138 Some might want to call being equal in height being perfectly
alike in height. But this would rest equality, a quantitative attribute, on a form
of likeness, or perhaps turn it into a likeness. This would be bad metaphysics,
to Thomas, for he held that quantitative accidents were most immediate to
substance, and qualities inhere in substances through their quantities.139 It
would also violate ordinary use and intuition. 2+2 pounds and 4 pounds
are not perfectly similar quantities. “2+2 pounds” and “4 pounds” name the
same quantity. It is because 2+2 pounds and 4 pounds are the same quantity
that a 2+2- and a 4 pound thing are perfectly similar with respect to quantity.
(Likeness rests on having “the same” attributes, said Thomas, and not with-
out reason.) Equality is sameness of quantity. Equality involves something
on the order of identity in a nonsubstance category. This is Aquinas’ view.
It acknowledges a realist intuition. The question is how a trope nominalist
can accommodate it. Because Thomas does not believe in real universals to
give it heft, and can’t reduce it to a sort of likeness, he treats equality as a
135. S. Thomae Aquinatis In Librum Beati Dionysii “De Divinis Nominibus” Expositio,
ed. Pera (Rome: Marietti, 1950), chap. 4, l. 6, #361, p. 118. This is a gloss on Aristotle’s
claim that the same are one in substance, the like one in quality, the equal one in
quantity. For Thomas’s endorsement of this propria persona, see In I Sent., d. 19,
q. 1, a. 1.
136. In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4, p. 463.
137. In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1c, p. 462.
138. I show elsewhere that for Thomas, numbers are quantities and come in
species. Thus, for Thomas, the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” asserts an identity between “two”
species of quantity.
139. E.g., ST IIIa 77, 2.
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direct same-species relation between equals, whose being such we recognize.
When it seems to us that two four pound things have the same quantity, what
we intuit, as Thomas sees it, is that two 4-pound things have the same kind
of quantity.
For Thomas, likeness always is a matter of “agreement in one form.”
But this can be because things share part but not all of their specific natures,
or because they have the same quality, to the same or a different degree, or
because they share more qualities than they differ in.140 The first is a case
of “generic likeness.” The others are said to involve having “one species” of
quality.141 Thomas writes that
things are called similar (which) are in some way the same in species, as
for example a larger quadrilateral is said to be like a smaller when one’s
angles are equal to another’s and the sides . . . are proportional . . . this
likeness (is) according to unity of figure and proportion.142
So likeness seems in the genus-case to be irreducible, but in the others to
be the same-species relation for qualities: it is a mode of identity for a non-
substance category. And the genus case is not founded on attributes in the
category of quality, but rather on “secondary substance,” and so it does not
block our saying simply that likeness is the same-species relation for qualities.
Following Aristotle, Thomas analyzes likeness in terms of unity, rather than
providing an analysis of unity of quality in terms of likeness. Once more,
this acknowledges realist intuitions: when two items are red, we want to say,
they are not just alike, but alike because they have the same color. If Thomas
were willing to say there was one entity that is the color of both, he could
give this intuition full sway. As he is not, he acknowledges it baldly: yes, there
is a sort of sameness here, which we recognize intuitively and which is not
identity of constituent.
Thomas holds that relations rest on some kind of foundation in the
relata, that is, that any xy stand in a relation only due to other facts about
x and about y.143 (For instance, if Smith is taller than Jones, this is because
Smith is 5′1′′ and Jones is 4′11′′.) So Thomas is committed to there being
some foundation for the same-species relation. Elsewhere, Thomas writes
that equality “follows upon” things’ quantities.144 He explains,
If someone through a change in him becomes equal to me while I am
not changed, that equality was first in me in some way, as in its root
140. In X Met., l. 4, ##2009–12.
141. In X Met., l. 4, ##2011, p. 573.
142. In X Meta., l. 4, #2008, p. 572.
143. ST Ia 28, 1; DP 7, 9; In V Meta., l. 17, passim; In III Phys., l. 1, #549; In I Sent.,
d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.
144. DP 7, 9 ad 5, p. 244.
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from which it has real being. For since I have such quantity, it pertains
to me that I be equal [in size] to all those who have the same quantity.
So if someone has that quantity for the first time, that common root
of equality is determined to him. And so nothing comes to me for the
first time from the fact that I begin to be equal to another through his
changing.145
Smith is 5′1′′. Due to this, Smith is potentially equal in height to any other
5′1′′ object. When Jones becomes 5′1′′, the potentiality is actualized. Nothing
else is needed; it follows that they are of equal height. Being 5′1′′ and being
equal in height are obviously distinct attributes. Just one is nonrelational.
Just one is intrinsic. And, of course, Smith and Jones could just as easily be
equal of height at 5′2′′. If being 5′1′′ and being equal in height are distinct
attributes, “Jones is 5′1′′ and Smith is 5′1′′ and “Jones and Smith are equal in
height” express distinct states of affairs. So there is something on the order
of supervenience here.146 Thomas thus uses “one in quantity” to gesture at
that on which equality supervenes: what it is about Jones and Smith when
Jones becomes 5′1′′ that makes them equal, that constitutes them a case of
equality in height. But this isn’t anything profound. It is simply Smith’s and
Jones’s both having tropes of being 5′1′′.
Equality is a not-further-analyzable sameness of species grounded on
having tropes of what we intuitively want to call the same quantity. Likeness
is a not-further-analyzable sameness of species grounded on having tropes of
the same quality. Substantial sameness of species is the secondary-substance
analogue of sameness of quantity and quality. So substantial sameness of
species should turn out to be a primitive relation grounded on having tropes
of “the same” kind-nature. As sameness of quantity and quality are sorts of
sameness of species, perhaps we can also say that there is for Thomas a
same-species relation, cases of which can link cases of substance, quality,
or quantity. Or perhaps there are just three relations here which share an
analogical likeness. In any case, it is just a brute fact about certain tropes,
an ontological ultimate, that they subvene this (these) relation(s) between
their bearers.
Thus, when Thomas writes that being one in substance “makes” iden-
tity, he may mean “one in substance” to suggest a foundation/explanation
pattern like that in the quantity case. He may have in mind something
like: Socrates is human. Plato is human. So they are of the same species.
That is, their tropes are foundations for a same-kind relation; having tropes
145. In V Phys., l. 3, #1292, pp. 283–84. (trans. Mark Henninger).
146. Henninger reads Thomas as holding that the equality and the height are
not quite fully distinct: a relation and its foundation have the same being—make
the same contribution to the intrinsic character and existence of the subject—but
involve distinct forms (Henninger, Relations, 29–31; my phrasing of this summary
is indebted to Jeff Brower). I am not sure what to make of this, but as long as the
“forms” involved differ, the claim of supervenience seems secure.
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and having them found this relation constitutes being of the same kind for
substances. This relation is intrinsically founded, since being human is an
intrinsic property. But for Thomas, this relation is irreflexive.147 (Thomas
holds that identity of species is a “real” relation, but also that no reflexive
relation is in this sense “real.”148) If it is irreflexive and a human enters it as
a whole, it is not itself an intrinsic attribute of the human, if (again) intrinsic
attributes are (very roughly) those an item could have if the universe ended
at its skin. As intrinsically-based but nonintrinsic, the same-species relation
can serve to interpret “the nature is common” in terms of facts about but
not “in” the nature’s instances.
On this account, then, Plato and Socrates are the same in species al-
though they have no constituents in common. Thomas does not explain
how Plato and Socrates are the same in species by positing an abstract ob-
ject, a species, to which both have the same relation. Such explanations are
Platonist in form. Rather, for Thomas, sameness of species is a direct rela-
tion between items in the species, based on their kind-tropes. He reverses
the Platonist’s direction of explanation. The Platonist appeals to the iden-
tity of an abstract object to explain a relation between Plato and Socrates:
for the Platonist, Plato and Socrates are of one species because the species
of Socrates = the species of Plato. Thomas instead appeals to a relation
between Plato and Socrates to explain the oneness of some further object
we can call their species: many humans stand in same-species relations, and
this is why we can at least speak of and define such a thing as human nature
absolutely considered.
For Thomas, a trope of a species-nature is a way things are one (or
apt to be so, if they chance to be their natures’ only instance). For it is
the sort of thing on which a same-species relation supervenes. (Just so, a
trope of being 5′1′′ is a way quantities and so quantified things are apt to be
one, as it is the sort of thing on which a same-species relation for quantities
supervenes.) This, I suggest, is what Thomas means by “a nature considered
in itself is common.”149 This does not predicate a modal property of the
nature considered absolutely. It asserts that each trope is intrinsically apt to
subvene a same-species relation. An accident like whiteness exists in that by
it, things are white. So, too, ways things are one (natures) exist in that by
them, things are one (or apt to be so).
147. ST Ia 28, 1 ad 2 insists that no reflexive relation is real, asserts this in particular
of self-identity, and expressly contrasts this with the case of generic and specific
identity.
148. ST Ia 28, 2 ad 2 et 4 ad 1; In V Meta., l. 11, #912; In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1;
In I Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 1; DV 1, 5 ad 16. The scarequotes emphasize that (as should
be clear) in this claim “real” has some other-than-usual sense. At DP 7, 11 ad 3,
Thomas acknowledges that in a sense more like our usual one, we are really self-
identical.
149. DP 9, 1, p. 268.
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This gives us, I think, Aquinas’ answer to the questions common predica-
tion raises about attributes. His view is a version of nominalism, a trope nom-
inalism enriched by same-species relations. Trope theories have a limited
menu of alternatives to Thomas’s enrichment, if they genuinely want to ac-
commodate realist intuitions that Smith and Jones have “the same” height.
One might want to say that being one in height is there being one height
a trope of which Smith and Jones both have. But trope theorists must take
care how they parse this ontologically. They must avoid immanent realism
about kinds of tropes. If tropes can instance real universals, why not par-
ticulars? For like reasons they must avoid Platonic abstract objects tropes
instance. However, we have intuitions that tell against taking equality as a
form of likeness. Thus, perhaps, Thomas’s move: a primitive relation con-
nects things bearing these tropes, a same-species relation, and it is because
a trope of this relation unites them that they are of the same height. All
5′1′′-tropes subvene same- or equal-height relations; to have tropes of “one”
height subvenes being of equal height.
SO WHAT?
If we have Thomas’s theory of attributes aright, the next and more interest-
ing question is: should we adopt it? One weak point is doubtless his account
of the same-species relation. The Lewis-style “definition” I have given it does
not analyze a concept. So even if Thomas’s same-species relation has this sort
of “definition,” it is primitive, or even sui generis. This is a problem when we
do not find the primitive familiar, for example, if it is not somehow given
in direct experience. And while Thomas can claim that this primitive re-
sponds to intuitions we truly have, it is another thing altogether to count
these as forms of direct experience, “givens” (in whatever sense we have
such). Yet, if Thomas invokes a primitive relation, this leaves him no worse
off than many realists (consider Platonists’ difficulties with participation,
or other realists’ with exemplification), and perhaps he might argue that
it gives him an advantage over other forms of nominalism—e.g., a securer
basis for claiming that only some classes/wholes are “natural,” in addition to
responding to the intuitions mentioned. Those who unify natural classes via
likeness invoke a relation equally primitive, unless one defines it in some-
thing like Aquinas’ way. It is a more familiar primitive, but this does not
imply that it does a better ontological job than Thomas’. A full evaluation
of his view would require seeing how it fares against the sorts of problem
which bedevil other theories of universals. That is matter for a book, not an
article.
